Recent research on mutual fund performance has ignored the impact of initial public offering on mutual fund performance. We show that the real estate mutual funds returns, at least in the 1990's, are almost entirely a function of REIT IPO returns, and that, after controlling for the REIT IPO returns, the real estate mutual funds exhibit no sensitivity to the Fama-French or momentum factors. We find that while REIT IPOs exhibited statistically significant long-run abnormal performance, real estate mutual funds did not.
IPO and Mutual Fund Returns

Introduction
A number of papers have examined the investment performance of mutual funds. 1 While these papers have focused on the important subjects of alternative models for portfolio measurement and performance attribution, the focus of this paper is on examining the portfolios underlying mutual funds and their impact on mutual fund performance. In particular, our focus is on the role of initial public offering (IPO) inclusion in a mutual fund portfolio. Given the interesting result of Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) that real estate mutual funds outperformed all other mutual funds, we focus on real estate mutual funds and the role of IPOs in explaining their return patterns.
We find that the real estate mutual funds that Pastor and Stambaugh examined were heavily invested in REIT IPOs. Our results show that while at one level real estate mutual funds are indeed sensitive to Carhart's (1997) momentum factor, it is an indirect effect. It is their underlying holdings of REIT IPOs that are sensitive to the momentum factor, and after controlling for the behavior of REIT IPO's during their study period, the real estate mutual funds are not sensitive to Carhart's momentum factor. Perhaps most importantly, our results show that, although REIT IPOs were the primary determinant of real estate mutual fund behavior, the real estate mutual funds did not perform as well as the REIT IPOs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes REIT IPO behavior. Section 3 describes the data used in the study. Section 4 describes the 1 See, for example, Carhart (1997) , Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) , Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1996) , Ferson and Schadt (1996) , Grinblatt and Titman (1992) , Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) , Lehmann and Modest (1987) , Kallberg, Liu, and Trzcinka (2000) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2000) . methodology used. Section 5 presents the results and analysis. Section 6 concludes the paper.
REIT IPO Behavior
As shown in Table 2 , there were two distinct waves of REIT IPOs, the 1993 -1994 wave and the 1997-1998 wave. The 1993-1994 wave consisted of 88 IPO issuances, while the 1997-1998 wave consisted of 43 issuances. These two waves accounted for 84% of all REIT IPOs issued in the 1990s. A number of papers have examined the behavior of REIT IPOs during this time, with the most significant being Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) , and Ling and Ryngaert (1997) . Wang, Chang, and Gau (1992) used data on equity REIT IPOs from 1971 through 1988. Their paper, which focused primarily on the initial behavior of REIT IPOs, found that REIT IPOs tended to have negative initial returns, indicating overpricing of REIT IPOs. They further found that the REIT IPOs under-performed seasoned REITs in the 120 day period after their offering. Ling and Ryngaert (1997) , found contrasting results. For their REIT IPO sample, which consisted of 85 equity REIT IPOs issued between 1990-1994, they found that the REIT IPOs tended to experience positive initial returns, indicating initial underpricing.
Further, they found that REIT IPOs tended to outperform seasoned REIT offerings during the first 100 days of their issuance.
The Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) and the Ling and Ryngaert (1997) papers focus on the initial performance of REIT IPOs and on their performance in their first few months of issuance. They do this to examine the performance of REIT IPOs relative to the performance of more traditional stock IPOs. Buttimer, Hyland, and Sanders (2001) examine the long-term returns to REITs and REIT IPOs. Using an independent sample of both equity and mortgage REITs issued between 1980 and 1999, they find no evidence of long-run abnormal returns to REIT IPOs prior to 1990, but significant and positive longterm abnormal returns to REIT IPOs during the mid 1990s.
Taking these three papers in total, one can reasonably draw the conclusion that the behavior of REIT IPOs has changed over time. These papers also show that one must temper the analysis and interpretation of results from any study of REIT performance with an understanding of the time period during which the study's data was collected.
Coupling this with results of the Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) paper, one must question if their results are an artifact of REIT IPO performance, and not a generally applicable result for real estate mutual funds.
Although the presentation of their methodology is the focus of their paper, Pastor and Stambaugh nevertheless make some broad statements about the sensitivity of real estate funds to Carhart's momentum factor, and about the behavior of investors wishing to include that factor in their own portfolio. In particular they state "real estate funds, interestingly, tend to exhibit positive sensitivities to that factor as well as to the three Fama-French factors, so these funds occupy much of the optimal portfolio for such a factor." 2 They also note that, based on their results, an investor that is skeptical about the skills of fund managers increasing their returns will invest "heavily in real estate funds, which have higher exposure to the momentum factor and the Fama-French factors." number of real estate mutual funds, it is reasonable to examine the composition of those funds. In particular, six real estate funds appear repeatedly in the portfolios that Pastor and Stambaugh report. 4   Table 3 lists these funds, and shows the degree to which they have invested in REIT IPOs.
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The data for Table 3 comes from the fund's SEC form 30-d filings. For each fund, Table 3 shows, as of various filing dates, the percentage of the fund's holdings that are REITS IPOs issued within either the last three years (column 3) or in the last five years (column 4).
For the four funds with filings available in 1995, all have more than half of their holdings in REIT IPOs issued in the previous three years. Since their percentage holdings of REIT IPOs issued in the previous five years are identical, it is reasonable to conclude that all of these holdings were REIT IPOs issued in 1993 , 1994 , or 1995 their 1996 filings show little change in their percentage of holdings issued in the previous three years, it is also reasonable to conclude that the vast majority of their holdings were purchased in the 1994 and 1995 period. 6 This is important because it corresponds with the time period of the Ling and Ryngaert (1997) data. In essence these managers purchased REIT IPOs at precisely the time that REITs IPOs in general started to perform well. Over the next five years, their holdings in recently issued REIT IPOs declines, but this is most likely a function of the aging of their holdings. In examining the 30-d forms it appears the REIT mutual funds did not regularly turn over their holdings, but that as their holdings seasoned, they naturally fell out of "issued within the past three years" and "issued within the past five years" categories.
This begs the question of why an investor would purchase a real estate mutual fund when these funds are primarily invested in REITs. Pastor and Stambaugh suggest that real estate mutual funds have a high sensitivity to Carhart's momentum factor, and that this alone may be a reason to purchase these funds. If the REITs do not, this may well be the differentiating factor. This is a testable hypothesis, and one that we analyze in the following sections. 
Data Sample
To investigate the relationship between real estate mutual funds and REIT IPOs we needed data on both the mutual funds, their holdings and the REIT IPOs. We begin by collecting a sample of REITs that completed an IPO over the last two decades (See Table   1 ). We obtained the REIT IPO data from two sources. The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) provided data for REIT IPOs issued from 1992 through 1999, while Thompson Financial Services (SDC) provided the data from the 1980 through 1991 period. We collected returns from CRSP and eliminated firms not included in the CRSP database. We collected mutual fund data from Morningstar's mutual fund database. Morningstar tracks the monthly returns on numerous mutual funds including those specializing in real estate. 7 Of course there may be other reasons that investors might select a mutual fund of REITs over the REITs themselves. One potential reason may be that the funds have access to the REIT IPO market that individual investors do not have. A second potential reason is that real estate mutual fund companies may have marketing advantages, in terms of an established customer base and distribution network, that REITs do not have.
Methodology
Our aim is to compare the long-run behavior of REIT IPOs with that of the real estate mutual funds and the extent to which mutual fund performance differs with regards to REIT IPOs. Our goal is to examine not only the returns to these IPOs as compared to the mutual funds, but also their relative sensitivity to the Fama-French and Carhart factors. To do this we must first select a general method for analyzing the long-run REIT IPO performance. In the equity literature a common method is to form matching samples to study the long run performance of IPOs. For this reason we focus on using portfolios of REITs and testing their monthly returns. This is similar to the methodologies in Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Brav and Gompers (1997) . This methodology has the added benefit of allowing us to work within the same framework that Pastor and Stambaugh use, although we do not implement their Bayesian approach.
We construct four REIT IPO portfolios starting with the initial 1980 IPOs. Summary statistics are provided in Table 4 . The first portfolio is an equally weighted portfolio that consists of all REIT IPOs issued in the preceding three years (thirty-six months). As new IPO's are issued, they enter the portfolio and stay in it for thirty-six months, at which point they drop out. This type of construction could lead to some anomalous results during the initial months or years of the portfolio, but given that the time period of interest to us is the 1990's, those issues should be of little concern. The second portfolio is also an equally weighted portfolio, but one in which the REITs stay in the portfolio for five years (60 months). The third and fourth portfolios are valueweighted portfolios in which the REIT IPOs stay in the portfolio for 3 and 5 years, respectively.
In a similar vein, we construct portfolios of equally weighted real estate mutual funds. The first portfolio is an equally weighted portfolio consisting of all real estate mutual funds in our sample. This portfolio begins in 1980 and covers the same period as our REIT IPO data. The second portfolio consists of the six mutual funds that repeatedly appear in the Pastor and Stambaugh tables. We refer to this as the Pastor and Stambaugh six mutual fund portfolio. This portfolio begins in 1991 and covers the remainder of our sample period. Table 4 presents summary statistics for each of the REIT IPO and real estate mutual fund portfolios.
After creating these portfolios, we use them as dependent variables in a series of four-factor regressions that use the three Fama-French (1993) factors as well as Carhart's (1997) momentum factor as independent variables. Since we have a total of six portfolios, the four REIT IPO portfolios and the two mutual fund portfolios, we estimate six different regression equations. They all have the same general form: Analyzing the real estate mutual fund portfolios separately from the REIT IPOs allows an initial examination of the issues, but it implicitly creates an endogeneity problem. Since the real estate mutual funds consist largely of REIT IPOs, to fully understand the relationship between the real estate mutual funds and the four factors, we must first control for the four factor's effects on the REIT IPOs. We do this through instrumental variables regression approach. Note that we use White's adjusted t-statistics to correct for heteroskedasticity in all regressions.
Results and Analysis
We begin the analysis by first examining each portfolio in a single-stage regression. Table 5 presents the results of these regressions for the REIT IPOs, while Table 6 presents the results for the real estate mutual funds. We later use an instrumental variables regression to control for the REIT IPO effects on mutual fund performance. Table 5 presents the results of the regressions using the REIT IPOs. For the entire sample period, for all four portfolios, the intercept terms are not significantly different from zero. That is, there is no evidence of abnormal performance. The sub-periods, however, tell a remarkably different story. Consider the 1980-1990 sub-period, the period that best matches the result of the Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) paper. During this period the intercepts are negative and statistically significant for both the three and five year equally weighted portfolios, and, although not statistically significant, are negative for the value weighted portfolios as well. This is indicative of long-run negative performance in the REIT IPO market during this time period. This is negative performance in addition to the negative initial performance documented by Wang, Chan, and Gau (1993).
Single Stage Regression Results
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The 1990's periods, however, show quite a different set of results. In the 1990-1994 period, the period that corresponds to both the Ling-Ryngaert study, and the period during which many of the real estate mutual funds purchased REIT IPOs, the intercept terms for both of the three-year portfolios are positive and statistically significant, as is the value-weighted five-year portfolio. Clearly there has been a structural shift in the REIT IPO market. This time period also corresponds to a very active period of REIT IPO issuance. These long-run abnormal returns are in addition to Ling and Ryngaert's finding of abnormal positive returns to REIT IPO issuances. Note that for the 1990-1998 period, the period that encompasses the two 1990's REIT IPO issuance waves and the PastorStambaugh sample period, we find somewhat similar results: both of the three-year portfolios and the five-year value weighted portfolios have positive intercepts but they are not significant. The lack of significance is driven by negative performance in 1998
when REIT IPOs performed poorly. The intercepts indicate positive and persistent abnormal returns to the REIT IPOs.
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In Table 6 we present results from the same basic regressions except that we use portfolios of mutual funds as the dependent variable. We use two portfolios: one consisting of all of the real estate mutual funds in our sample, and one consisting of Pastor and Stambaugh's six mutual fund portfolio. In none of the cases are any of the intercepts significant. This is true regardless of the time period used or the length of time that the mutual funds stay in the portfolio. We conclude, therefore, that there is no evidence for abnormal performance by real estate mutual funds.
What is notable, however, is the sensitivity of the two real estate mutual fund portfolios to the various factors in the regressions. Recall that Pastor and Stambaugh assert that an investor may elect to include these mutual funds in a portfolio precisely to increase their exposure to these sensitivities. We, therefore, focus on these sensitivities in the rest our analysis.
We begin with the Pastor and Stambaugh six mutual fund portfolio. For both the 1990-1994 and 1990-1998 periods, the momentum factor is positive and highly significant; results that are consistent with Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) . Similarly, the three traditional Fama-French factors are positive and significant for the [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] period, but the HML factor is not significant in the 1990-1994 period.
The sensitivities are not as strong for the portfolio consisting of all of the real estate mutual funds. In fact, for the entire sample period, i.e. from 1980-1998, the momentum factor is not statistically significant, although the three Fama-French factors are highly significant. For the 1980-1988 period the momentum factor is not significant.
During the 1990-1998 period, however, we find that momentum is positive and highly significant. Similarly, we find that all three of the Fama-French factors are positive and highly significant. The same is true for the 1990-1994 sub-period.
There are two points to note from these results. The real estate mutual funds responded very differently to the four factors in the 1980s than they did in the 1990s. This is consistent with the extant REIT literature, which tends to indicate that there was a structural shift in the REIT market in the early 1990s. The second is that the mutual funds themselves exhibit virtually no evidence of abnormal returns, while the REIT IPOs exhibited significant abnormal returns, especially in the early 1990s. One possible explanation for this is that the real estate mutual fund managers were able to extract these abnormal returns instead of passing them on to their shareholders. A second possible explanation is that the mutual fund managers faced transaction costs high enough to eradicate the abnormal costs that they did earn.
Instrumental Variable Regression Results
Regardless of the reason, however, it still is the case that an investor would have earned a higher return with the REIT IPOs than with the mutual funds. An important implication of Pastor and Stambaugh's paper, however, is that an investor may have chosen to purchase real estate mutual funds not because of their returns per se, but rather because of their relative sensitivity to various factors, notably Carhart's momentum factor.
From Table 2 it is clear that the six Pastor and Stambaugh mutual funds consist largely of REIT IPOs. This raises the question of whether the mutual funds were sensitive to these factors as a secondary effect, i.e. simply because of the sensitivity of the underlying REIT IPOs to these factors, or, whether the sensitivities were a primary factor,
i.e. they were a function of the management of the mutual fund. If the funds were inherently sensitive, then Pastor and Stambaugh's suggestion that they be included in a mutual fund portfolio to capture these effects would still hold. If, however, the funds were sensitive only because their underlying assets were sensitive, then an investor would likely be better off purchasing the underlying assets rather than the mutual funds.
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Answering this question requires controlling for the returns to the REIT IPOs, the Fama-French factors, and Carhart's momentum factor. Since REIT IPOs were sensitive to the various factors, an endogeneity problem exists, and so we work with an instrumental variables regression approach. We first estimate the returns to the REIT IPOs and then use those estimated returns as an instrumental variable, along with the Fama-French and Carhart factors, as independent variables in a regression of the REIT mutual fund returns. The following section describes our methodology.
In the first step we estimate the returns to REIT IPOs using the traditional FamaFrench three-factor regression. We do this using the value weighted five-year REIT portfolio. We then use fitted values from this regression as an instrumental variable in the second stage regression. This allows us to isolate the marginal effect of the MOMENTUM variable on the mutual fund returns as well as the marginal intercept. Note that to avoid collinearity problems, we include a time variable in the first stage regression, and drop the Fama-French MARKET variable in the second regression. Thus, the first regression to estimate the REIT IPO instrumental variable is
while the second step regression is
We estimate this system of equations using the total real estate mutual fund portfolio as well as the Pastor and Stambaugh six mutual fund portfolio. These results indicate that the only factor driving the real estate mutual fund returns is the explained returns to the REIT IPOs. The Fama-French factors and the momentum factor only affect the real estate mutual fund returns indirectly; that is, because they determine the returns to the REIT IPOs, they affect the returns to the mutual funds. This is born out by the large increase in explanatory power of the two-stage regressions of the basic OLS regressions.
The results for the second regression using the portfolio consisting of the entire real estate mutual fund sample provide additional insight into the market. In the 1990-98
period the second stage regression shows that after controlling for the risk factors and their holdings of REIT IPOs, the mutual fund portfolios have negative abnormal returns.
Investors would have been better off investing in the primitive assets, i.e. the REITs, with the exposure to the Fama-French, and momentum factors. In addition the results for all mutual funds are consistent with the idea of a structural change in the REIT market.
As is the case with the six mutual fund portfolio, the fitted REIT IPO returns are always significant, and the Fama-French factors are never significant. The momentum factor is significantly negative in the two 1990's time periods. These results are consistent with the idea that after 1990, REIT IPOs became the primary factor determining real estate mutual fund returns. Prior to 1990, although REIT IPO returns were statistically significant, there were other factors that determined real estate mutual fund returns, although these factors have not been identified. By the early 1990's, however, REIT IPO returns had become the primary determinant of real estate mutual fund returns.
Real Estate Mutual Fund Manager Performance
So far our analysis has focused on the determinants of the real estate mutual fund returns, we have not examined the performance of the real estate mutual fund managers.
We can do this by examining the intercepts of the various regressions.
Recall that in Table 5 , the REIT IPOs were shown in general to exhibit statistically significant positive abnormal returns during the entire 1990s and during the various sub-periods of the 1990s. The real estate mutual funds, however, show no similar pattern, and, in fact, the portfolio consisting of all real estate mutual funds shows statistically significant negative performance for both the entire 1990's and the 1990-1994 period. The intercept in the regressions involving the portfolio of six real estate mutual funds uniformly had intercepts that were not statistically different from zero.
These results do not speak well of real estate mutual fund manager performance during that period. In general mutual funds were heavily invested in assets, the REIT IPOs, which had positive abnormal returns. They were so heavily invested, in fact, that they largely determined the overall return to the mutual fund, yet the mutual funds themselves did not exhibit these positive abnormal returns, but at times exhibited abnormal negative returns. In short, the real estate mutual fund clients did not receive the excess returns that the holders of the REIT IPOs received. Whether these excess returns were lost due to high management fees, overly large trading costs or commissions, or through operational inefficiencies is a direction for future research. performance when compared to a larger sample of REIT mutual funds.
Conclusion
The market for securitized real estate, be it REIT IPOs or real estate mutual funds has clearly evolved over time. This is partially illustrated by the Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) and Ling and Ryngaert (1997) studies, studies that use data from different time periods that have almost diametrically opposed results. Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) show that initial REIT IPO performance in the 1980's and 1970's tend to be negative and statistically significant, while Ling and Ryngaert (1997) show that initial REIT IPO performance in the early 1990's tends to be positive and significant. One interpretation of 14 Buying the REIT IPO portfolios would entail trading costs to rebalance the portfolio. We adjust for these in figures 1-3. We do not assume any trading costs for buying the real estate mutual funds. Jones and Lipson (1999) Table 5 . Four Factor Regressions for REIT IPOs in their first five years and first three years after going public. The second column shows the results of a regression using an equally weighted portfolio of REIT IPOs within the first 5 years of going public. The third column shows the results of a regression using a value weight portfolio of REIT IPOs within the first 5 years of going public. The fourth column shows the results of a regression using an equally weighted portfolio of REIT IPOs within the first 3 years of going public. The fifth column shows the results of a regression using a value weight portfolio of REIT IPOs within the first 3 years of going public. The dependent variable is the monthly return of a portfolio. The independent variables MARKET, SMB, HML are as described in Fama and French (1993) . J u l-9 1 O c t -9 1 J a n -9 2 A p r -9 2 J u l-9 2 O c t -9 2 J a n -9 3 A p r -9 3 J u l-9 3 O c t -9 3 J a n -9 4 A p r -9 4 J u l-9 4 O c t -9 4 J a n -9 5 A p r -9 5 J u l-9 5 O c t -9 5 J a n -9 6 A p r -9 6 J u l-9 6 O c t -9 6 J a n -9 7 A p r -9 7 J u l-9 7 O c t -9 7 J a n -9 8 A p r -9 8 J u l-9 8 O c t -9 8
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